The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, RussiaBeck, James M. (James Montgomery)
Philosophy
The Evidence in the Case: A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia
Beck, James M. (James Montgomery)
World War, 1914-1918 -- Causes
In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange
views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist
on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of
Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in
regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity
for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and
of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute
a certain guarantee for the future_.
This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise
pacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by
giving it "a serious lesson"--what such a lesson is let Louvain,
Liége, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.
Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that
Germany had declared that day the "_Kriegsgefahr_" and that the German
Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all hope of a peaceful
solution of the crisis" was at an end. The British Ambassador then
asked the Chancellor,--
whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities
at Vienna to do something in the general interests to
reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue
discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night
he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and
that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the
Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]
[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]
Here again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in
which the Chancellor "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the
Austrian Foreign Minister's reply.
While these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian
Ambassador in Vienna advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined not
to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving
troops against Russia as well as Servia."[73]
[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]
Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her
army.
Concurrently with these interviews, the English Ambassador in Vienna
had a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and
called his attention to the fact that during the discussion
of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of
Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia,
and that a compromise between the views of Russia and
Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.
Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not
regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him
any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present
case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the
Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above
conversation.[75]
[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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