The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
No conclusion can be formed save on purely logical arguments, and each
side advances reasons that carry a certain weight. There is, moreover, at
the bottom of the whole discussion, the grave error of identifying the
embryonic state of the mind with its adult forms, and of presupposing
a sharp initial distinction between discrimination and assimilation.
The question must remain open, incapable of positive solution by our
psychology. The incontestable truth with regard to the mind, as we know
it in its developed and organised state, is that the two processes
advance _pari passu_, and are reciprocally causative.
In sum, abstraction and generalisation considered as elementary acts of
the mind, and reduced to their simplest conditions, involve two processes:
1. The former, _abstraction_, implies a dissociative process, operating
on the raw data of experience. It has subjective causes which are
ultimately reducible to attention. It has objective causes which may be
due to the fact that a determinate quality is given us as an integral
part of widely different groups.
“Any total impression whose elements are never experienced apart must
be unanalysable. If all cold things were wet and all wet things cold,
if all liquids were transparent and no non-liquid were transparent,
we should scarcely discriminate between coldness and wetness and
scarcely ever invent separate names for liquidity and transparency....
What is associated now with one thing and now with another tends to
become dissociated from either, and to grow into an object of abstract
contemplation by the mind. One might call this the law of dissociation
by varying concomitants.”[8]
2. The latter, _generalisation_, originates in association by
resemblance, but even in its lowest degree it rises beyond this, since it
implies a synthetic act of fusion. It does not, in fact, consist in the
successive excitation of similar or analogous percepts, as in the case
where the image of St. Peter’s in Rome suggests to me that of St. Paul’s
in London, of the Pantheon in Paris, and of other churches with enormous
dimensions, of like architecture, and with gigantic domes. It is a
condensation. The mind resembles a crucible with a precipitate of common
resemblances at the bottom, while the differences have been volatilised.
In proportion as we recede from this primitive and elementary form, the
constitution of the general idea demands other psychological conditions
which cannot be hastily enumerated.
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