The evolution of general ideasRibot, Th. (Théodule)
Science
The evolution of general ideas
Ribot, Th. (Théodule)
Abstraction; Imagination
Save in extremely rare cases,—supposing such to occur at all, as
perhaps in the instant of surprise, and in states approximating to pure
sensation,—save in such extremely rare cases, where the mind, like a
mirror, passively reflects external impressions, intellectual activity
may always be reduced to one of the two following types: associating,
combining, unifying, or dissociating, isolating, and separating. These
cardinal operations underlie all forms of _cognition_, from the lowest to
the highest, and constitute its unity of composition.
Abstraction belongs to the second type. It is a normal and necessary
process of the mind, dependent on attention, i. e., on the limitation,
willed or spontaneous, of the field of consciousness. The act of
abstraction implies in its genesis both negative and positive conditions,
and is the result of these.
The negative conditions consist essentially in the fact that we cannot
apprehend more than one quality or one aspect, varying according to the
circumstances, in any complex whole,—because consciousness, like the
retina, is restricted to a narrow region of clear perception.
The positive condition is a state which has been appropriately termed a
“psychical reinforcement” of that which is being abstracted, and it is
naturally accompanied by a weakening of that which is abstracted from.
The true characteristic of abstraction is this partial increment of
intensity. While involving elimination, it is actually a positive mental
process. The elements or qualities of a percept, or a representation,
which we omit do not necessarily involve such suppression. We leave them
out of account simply because they do not suit our ends for the moment,
and are complementary.[2]
Abstraction being, then, in spite of negative appearances, a positive
operation, how are we to conceive it? Attention is necessary to it,
but it is more than attention. It is an augmentation of intensity,
but it is more than an augmentation of intensity. Suppose a group of
representations _a + b + c = d_. To abstract from _b_ and _c_ in favor
of _a_, would ostensibly give _a = d - (b + c)_. If this were so, _b_
and _c_ would be retained unaltered in consciousness; there would be no
abstraction. On the other hand, since it is impossible for the whole
representation _d_ to be suppressed outright, _b_ and _c_ cannot be
totally obliterated. They subsist, accordingly, in a residual state which
may be termed _x_, and the abstract representation is hence not _a_ but
_a + x_ or _A_. Thus the elements of abstract representations are the
same as those of concrete representations; only some are strengthened,
others weakened: whence arise new groupings. Abstraction, accordingly,
consists in the formation of new groups of representations which, while
strengthening certain elements of the concrete representations, weaken
other elements of the same.[3]
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