The Evolution of Naval ArmamentRobertson, Frederick Leslie
History
The Evolution of Naval Armament
Robertson, Frederick Leslie
Naval art and science -- History; Ordnance, Naval -- History; Warships -- History
At length, in 1745, general complaint of the inferiority of our
ships in size and scantlings forced improvement on the authorities.
Spain, who had joined France in war against us, possessed ships which
exceeded in size even French ships of the same rate. The capture in
1740 of a Spanish 70-gun ship, the _Princessa_, by three of our ships,
nominally of equal force with herself but of far inferior dimensions
and scantlings, is said to have been the chief cause of the new reform.
Their lordships of the Admiralty, surveying naval construction in
this country, noted that our royal ships were weak and crank, while
those of other nations went upright. There was no uniform standard
of size, ships of the same class were of different dimensions, the
existing establishment was not adhered to. They therefore decided on a
new establishment, based on the latest armament of guns; which should
result in ships which would carry their lower tier six feet above the
water, and four months’ provisions.
The new standard was of little avail, for the same error made some
thirty years previously was now repeated: with the augmentation of the
ship dimensions the armament was also raised in calibre. The first
rates were ordered to carry the 42-pounder (which had before been
optional) on their lower deck; the 90-gun ships, 12-pounders on their
upper decks; the eighties, 18-pounders and 9-pounders instead of 12’s
and 6’s; the seventies, which were only two hundred tons in excess of
the former establishment, 32-pounders and 18-pounders, instead of 24’s
and 12’s. “The ships, therefore, built by this establishment proved, in
general, very crank and bad sea-boats.”[24]
This establishment was, in point of fact, little adhered to. The war
with France during the years 1744-8 repeatedly revealed the defective
nature of our ship design. Experience pointed to the necessity either
of reduced gun-weights or of larger ships. Able administrators were
now willing, under the inspiration of such names as Hawke and Anson,
to initiate improvements. Our naval architecture at last took benefit,
though still by slow and cautious degrees, from foreign experience.
Some time was necessary for results to show themselves; not only were
new decisions slowly formed, but the rate of building was deliberately
slow. The _Royal George_, for instance, described as “the first
attempt towards emancipation from the former servitude,” was ten years
building. But, when war broke out again in 1756, the improvements
already embodied in the newest construction proved of considerable
benefit. The establishment of ’45 was given the credit. “The ships
built by the establishment of 1745,” says Derrick in his Memoirs, “were
found to carry their guns well, and were stiff ships, but they were
formed too full in their after part; and in the war which took place
in 1756, or a little before, some further improvements in the draughts
were therefore adopted, and the dimensions of the ships were also
further increased.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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