The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to EinsteinD'Abro, A. (Aram)
Science
The evolution of scientific thought from Newton to Einstein
D'Abro, A. (Aram)
Relativity (Physics); Science -- Methodology
To be sure, we may have to make a certain number of fundamental
assumptions, but we must regard these as mere working hypotheses which
may have to be abandoned at a later stage if peradventure they lead to
too complicated a synthesis of the facts of experiment. We shall see,
for instance, that relativity compels us to abandon our traditional
understanding of space and time. It is this fact more than any other
which has been responsible for the cool reception accorded to the
theory by many thinkers. When, however, we become convinced that
Einstein’s synthesis is the simplest that can be constructed if due
account be taken of the results of ultra-refined experiment, and when
we realise that a synthesis based on the classical understanding of
separate space and time would be possible only provided we were willing
to introduce a host of entirely disconnected hypotheses ad hoc
which would offer no means of direct verification, we cannot easily
contest the soundness of Einstein’s conclusions.
There are some, however, who argue that we have an a priori
intuitional understanding of space and time which is fundamental, and
[Pg xvi]
that we should sacrifice simplicity of mathematical co-ordination if
it conflicts with these fundamental intuitional notions. Needless to
say, no scientist could subscribe to such views. Quite independently
of Einstein’s discoveries, mathematicians had exploded these Kantian
opinions on space and time many years ago. As Einstein very aptly
remarks in his Princeton lectures:
“The only justification for our concepts and system of concepts is that
they serve to represent the complex of our experiences; beyond this
they have no legitimacy. I am convinced that the philosophers have had
a harmful effect upon the progress of scientific thinking in removing
certain fundamental concepts from the domain of empiricism where they
are under our control to the intangible heights of the a priori.
For even if it should appear that the universe of ideas cannot be
deduced from experience by logical means but is in a sense a creation
of the human mind without which no science is possible, nevertheless
this universe of ideas is just as little independent of the nature of
our experiences as clothes are of the form of the human body. This is
particularly true of our concepts of time and space which physicists
have been obliged by the facts to bring down from the Olympus of the
a priori in order to adjust them and put them in a serviceable
condition.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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