The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public BenefitsMandeville, Bernard
Philosophy
The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits
Mandeville, Bernard
Charity-schools -- Early works to 1800; Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Virtue -- Early works to 1800
In answer to this, I say, that it is impossible to judge of a man's
performance, unless we are thoroughly acquainted with the principle
and motive from which he acts. Pity, though it is the most gentle and
the least mischievous of all our passions, is yet as much a frailty of
our nature, as anger, pride, or fear. The weakest minds have generally
the greatest share of it, for which reason none are more compassionate
than women and children. It must be owned, that of all our weaknesses,
it is the most amiable, and bears the greatest resemblance to virtue;
nay, without a considerable mixture of it, the society could hardly
subsist: but as it is an impulse of nature, that consults neither the
public interest nor our own reason, it may produce evil as well as
good. It has helped to destroy the honour of virgins, and corrupted
the integrity of judges; and whoever acts from it as a principle,
what good soever he may bring to the society, has nothing to boast of,
but that he has indulged a passion that has happened to be beneficial
to the public. There is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready
to drop into the fire: the action is neither good nor bad, and
what benefit soever the infant received, we only obliged ourselves;
for to have seen it fall, and not strove to hinder it, would have
caused a pain, which self preservation compelled us to prevent: Nor
has a rich prodigal, that happens to be of a commiserating temper,
and loves to gratify his passions, greater virtue to boast of, when
he relieves an object of compassion with what to himself is a trifle.
But such men, as without complying with any weakness of their own,
can part from what they value themselves, and, from no other motive
but there love to goodness, perform a worthy action in silence:
such men, I confess, have acquired more refined notions of virtue
than those I have hitherto spoke of; yet even in these (with which
the world has yet never swarmed) we may discover no small symptoms
of pride, and the humblest man alive must confess, that the reward
of a virtuous action, which is the satisfaction that ensues upon it,
consists in a certain pleasure he procures to himself by contemplating
on his own worth: which pleasure, together with the occasion of it,
are as certain signs of pride, as looking pale and trembling at any
imminent danger, are the symptoms of fear.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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