The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public BenefitsMandeville, Bernard
Philosophy
The Fable of the Bees; Or, Private Vices, Public Benefits
Mandeville, Bernard
Charity-schools -- Early works to 1800; Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Virtue -- Early works to 1800
Cleo. I have made no such supposition of any man, and I protest to
you, that, in what I said, I had no other meaning than to observe,
that whatever frailties and natural infirmities persons might be
conscious of within, good sense and good manners were capable, and,
without any other assistance, sufficient to keep them out of sight:
but your questions are very reasonable, and since you have started
this, I will be very open to you, and acquaint you before hand
with my design of the description I am going to make; and the use I
intend it for; which in short is, to demonstrate to you, that a most
beautiful superstructure may be raised upon a rotten and despicable
foundation. You will understand me better presently.
Hor. But how do you know a foundation to be rotten that supports the
building, and is wholly concealed from you?
Cleo. Have patience, and I promise you, that I shall take nothing
for granted, which you shall not allow of yourself.
Hor. Stick close to that, and I desire no more: now say what you will.
Cleo. The true object of pride or vain glory is the opinion of
others; and the most superlative wish, which a man possessed, and
entirely filled with it can make, is, that he may be well thought of,
applauded, and admired by the whole world, not only in the present
but all future ages. This passion is generally exploded; but it is
incredible, how many strange and widely different miracles are, and may
be performed by the force of it; as persons differ in circumstances and
inclinations. In the first place, there is no danger so great, but by
the help of his pride a man may slight and confront it; nor any manner
of death so terrible, but with the same assistance he may court, and if
he has a firm constitution, undergo it with alacrity. In the second,
there are no good offices or duties, either to others or ourselves,
that Cicero has spoke of, nor any instance of benevolence, humanity,
or other social virtue, that Lord Shaftsbury has hinted at, but a man
of good sense and knowledge may learn to practise them from no better
principle than vain glory, if it be strong enough to subdue and keep
under all other passions that may thwart and interfere with his design.
Hor. Shall I allow all this?
Cleo. Yes.
Hor. When?
Cleo. Before we part.
Hor. Very well.
Cleo. Men of tolerable parts in plentiful circumstances, that were
artfully educated, and are not singular in their temper, can hardly
fail of a genteel behaviour: the more pride they have, and the greater
value they set on the esteem of others, the more they will make it
their study to render themselves acceptable to all they converse
with; and they will take uncommon pains to conceal and stifle in
their bosoms, every thing which their good sense tells them ought
not to be seen or understood.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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