For every crime there must be a punishment; for every wrong there must be a remedy, and for every grievance there must be a redress. That this state of things is wrong and unjust, if not unlawful, no fair-minded person will deny. It is not only wrong and unjust to the colored people of the State, who are thus denied a voice in the government under which they live and to support which they are taxed, but it also involves a grave injustice to the States in which the laws are obeyed and the National Constitution,--including the war amendments to the same,--is respected and enforced. I am aware of the fact that it is claimed by those who are responsible for what is here complained of that, while the acts referred to may be an evasion if not a violation of the spirit of the Constitution, yet, since they do not violate the letter of the Constitution the complaining parties are without a remedy, and therefore have no redress. This contention is not only weak in logic but unsound in law, even as construed by the Supreme Court of the United States, which tribunal seems to be the last to which an appeal can be successfully made, having for its object the enforcement of the Constitution and laws so far as they relate to the political and civil rights of the colored Americans. That a State can do by indirection what it cannot do directly, is denied even by the Supreme Court of the United States. That doctrine was clearly and distinctly set forth in a decision of the Court rendered by Mr. Justice Strong, which was concurred in by a majority of his associates. In that decision it was held that affirmative State action is not necessary to constitute race discrimination by the State. In other words, in order to constitute affirmative State action in violation of the Constitutional mandate against distinction and discrimination based on race or color, it is not necessary that the State should pass a law for that purpose. The State, the Court declared, acts through its agents, Legislative, Executive and Judicial. Whenever an agent or representative of the State acts, his acts are binding upon the State, and the effect is the same as if the State had passed a law for that purpose. If a judge, for example, in the selection of jurors to serve in his court should knowingly and intentionally allow a particular race to be excluded from such service on account of race or color, the effect would be the same as if the State, through its Legislature, had passed a law for that purpose. The colored men in the States complained of, have been disfranchised in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution, either by affirmative State action, or through and by the State's agents and representatives. Their acts, therefore, constitute State action as fully as if the Legislature had passed a law for that purpose. CHAPTER XXVI MISSISSIPPI AND THE NULLIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT