A word may have ceased from making any intellectual appeal, and yet be forcibly associated by word-counterfeiters and other agitators with certain vague desiderata which defy analysis. For instance, suppose a certain adult A. repeat again and again to a child B. that one day, if it is obedient and amenable, it will be taken to “Chekko’s.” The child may press for a description of “Chekko’s”; but all A. does is to nod his head, smile with prophetical good humour, and say: “Ah, you’ll see. It’s wonderful! It’s magic!” Here we have a case of a child to whom the word “Chekko’s” means literally nothing. It is, however, associated vaguely [p21] with something mysteriously desirable. “Chekko’s” may have no real existence, but certain emotions are nevertheless suscitated in the child by the sound of the word, because it has been led to believe that something dimly pleasant is associated with the name. Ultimately even a flag inscribed with the word “Chekko’s” will make the child shout with joy; a signpost with the direction: “To Chekko’s” will make it leap with excitement, and a mere passing reference to the “Checko-Slovaks” will lead it to suspect that these people must be a very pleasant and happy nation. A correct definition of “Chekko’s” given by someone whom the child trusts, would suffice either to dispel the emotion provoked by the sound, or else to confirm it, according to whether it had or had not a real existence, and that existence corresponded with the child’s fostered mental image of it. But in any case the process of dissuasion would take time, and the re-definition would have to be inculcated upon the child as assiduously as the false and hazy original association had been. It is possible, therefore, to provoke dynamic emotions by means of an absolutely meaningless sound, even when the intellect of the listener receives no appeal whatsoever. In view of this elementary fact in psychology, the extreme danger of having a very large number of both meaningless and inflammable words in our current speech will perhaps begin to be obvious. The fact that the word “Freedom” has now become practically meaningless--even more meaningless than Rousseau made it, [p22] because now it has not even a fictitious meaning--does not render it a whit less potent in provoking cheers and wild enthusiasm when it is shouted from the mystic eminence of a public platform.