Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did not
standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers, equally
satisfactory, may be given to this question. The industrious habits of
the people of the present day, absorbed in the pursuits of gain, and
devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce, are
incompatible with the condition of a nation of soldiers, which was the
true condition of the people of those republics. The means of revenue,
which have been so greatly multiplied by the increase of gold and
silver and of the arts of industry, and the science of finance, which
is the offspring of modern times, concurring with the habits of
nations, have produced an entire revolution in the system of war, and
have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the
citizens, the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them.
The rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so
inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be
maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case,
rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the
people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The
laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military
exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted,
nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state.
The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community
an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to
the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions,
neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of
jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a
power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their
rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the
magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or
insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against
the united efforts of the great body of the people.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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