Constitutional history -- United States -- Sources; Constitutional law -- United States
A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these questions will
justify a belief that the real disadvantages to Britain from such a
state of things, conspiring with the pre-possessions of a great part of
the nation in favor of the American trade, and with the importunities
of the West India islands, would produce a relaxation in her present
system, and would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the
markets of those islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive
the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British
government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in
exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a
correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not be
inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations
toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a
federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union
under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period
not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with
those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable
weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.
This would be more peculiarly the case in relation to operations in the
West Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the
reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the
fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest
magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most
commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the
usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of
military operations in the West Indies, it will readily be perceived
that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great
advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon
our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the
Union we may hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America,
and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this
part of the world as our interest may dictate.
But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover that
the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each other, and
would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature has kindly
placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our commerce would
be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations at war with each
other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would with little scruple
or remorse, supply their wants by depredations on our property as often
as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be
respected when they are defended by an adequate power. A nation,
despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of being
neutral.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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