The Fight for a Free Sea: A Chronicle of the War of 1812: The Chronicles of America Series, Volume 17Paine, Ralph Delahaye
History
The Fight for a Free Sea: A Chronicle of the War of 1812: The Chronicles of America Series, Volume 17
Paine, Ralph Delahaye
United States -- History -- War of 1812
A few weeks later General Dearborn, after his repeated failures to
shake the British grip on the Niagara front and the misfortunes which
had darkened his campaigns, was retired according to his wish. But the
American nation was not yet rid of its unsuccessful generals. James
Wilkinson, who was inscrutably chosen to succeed Dearborn, was a man of
bad reputation and low professional standing. "The selection of this
unprincipled imbecile," said Winfield Scott, "was not the blunder of
Secretary Armstrong." Added to this, Wilkinson was a man of broken
health. He was shifted from command at New Orleans because the Southern
Senators insisted that he was untrustworthy and incompetent. The regular
army regarded him with contempt.
Secretary Armstrong endeavored to mend matters by making his own
headquarters at Sackett's Harbor, where the next offensive, directed
against Montreal, was planned under his direction. Success hung upon the
cooperation and junction of two armies moving separately, the one under
Wilkinson descending the St. Lawrence, the other under Wade Hampton
setting out from Plattsburg on Lake Champlain. The fact that these two
officers had hated each other for years made a difficult problem no
easier. Hampton possessed uncommon ability and courage, but he was proud
and sensitive, as might have been expected in a South Carolina
gentleman, and he loathed Wilkinson with all his heart. That he should
yield the seniority to one whom he considered a blackguard was to him
intolerable, and he accepted the command on Lake Champlain with the
understanding that he would take no orders from Wilkinson until the two
armies were combined.
The expedition from Sackett's Harbor was ready to advance by way of the
St. Lawrence in October, 1813, and comprised seven thousand effective
troops. Even then the commanding general and the Secretary of War had
begun to regard the adventure as dubious and were accusing each other of
dodging the responsibility. Said Wilkinson to Armstrong: "It is
necessary to my justification that you should, by the authority of the
President, direct the operations of the army under my command
particularly against Montreal." Said Armstrong to Wilkinson: "I speak
conjecturally, but should we surmount every obstacle in descending the
river we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed
against us and in case of misfortune having no retreat, the army must
surrender at discretion." This was scarcely the spirit to inspire a
conquering army. As though to clinch his lack of faith in the
enterprise, the Secretary of War ordered winter quarters built for ten
thousand men many miles this side of Montreal, explaining in later years
that he had suspected the campaign would terminate as it did, "with the
disgrace of doing nothing."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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