The earlier portion of this narrative may have served to show roughly the condition of our harbor defenses at the outbreak of the last war, as well as the imperative need of heavy artillery troops with which to garrison them. The time has not yet arrived when the whole truth may be told safely, or even with propriety, but since the actual artillery strength on duty during the war is a matter of easily accessible record, it may here receive momentary attention. Briefly summarized, there were in service for the protection of our four thousand miles of sea-coast but ninety-three heavy batteries, of which seventy were in the regular establishment and twenty-three were in the volunteers. Over one-half of the latter were contributed by Massachusetts alone, in her First Heavy Artillery, and it seems fitting again to refer to the fact that her twelve trained and disciplined batteries were the only ones obtainable from the militia of the entire country at the outbreak of hostilities. Of the remaining volunteer heavy batteries, four each were hastily recruited in California and Maine, two in Connecticut, and one in South Carolina. The event proved that but six of the entire ninety-three batteries were destined to take part in any actual fighting. These were four from the Third United States Artillery and two from the California volunteers, which—when the destruction of Montojo's fleet had allayed all fears for the safety of the Pacific coast—were relieved from duty in the fortifications and ordered to report to General Merritt, under whom they saw service as infantry in the land operations around Manila. After what already has been said, it would seem that no elaborate explanation should be required to show why the heavy artillery arm failed to obtain more brilliant service in the last war. It must be borne in mind that its first and most important function is the defence of coast fortifications; its second, operations with the siege train in the reduction of fortified places; its third—and this only in rarely occurring emergencies—service as infantry. In the late war with Spain, as in any future European war, it was a matter of vital necessity to man our coast defenses, and to keep them manned until the threatening fleet had been swept from the seas; that once accomplished, and the artillerymen might reasonably have hoped for further service in the expected final operations at Havana. But with the naval victory off Santiago came the collapse of the war—and the ending of hope for the artillery.