This is not the place to relate the story of the renaissance of British military power. The virtue of the measures adopted by Lord Haldane as Secretary for War lay in the fact that he did homage to the essential principle which must underlie all schemes of defence by an island kingdom, which is the nerve centre of a maritime Empire. As in Opposition he had been foremost in advertising our dependence upon the sea, so in office, as Minister responsible for the Army, he based all his schemes on the assumption that the British Army is the projectile of a supreme fleet, to be hurled oversea as soon as the naval authority is able to give guarantee of safe passage. It was in the light of this essential truth that the Expeditionary Force was organised, and the Volunteers converted into the Territorial Army. Mistakes were, no doubt, made; no man who avoids them can ever expect to do anything. But at practically no additional expense, and without, therefore, withdrawing a penny from the necessary provision of the fleet, Lord Haldane initiated and completed military schemes, the value of which became apparent when we were confronted with the necessity of entering upon a contest with two of the great military powers of Europe, which possessed fleets of such a standing that they could offer challenge to our supremacy afloat. The survey of British naval policy in the years immediately preceding the war would be incomplete were no reference made to the fact, of which we were insistently reminded when hostilities opened, that sea power, even more than military power, must stand defeated from the very outset, unless it is supplemented by economic power. In the past the weakness of all democracies when faced by war has been apparent. However great the power on the sea, however formidable the military arm ashore, the real strength of a people lies in itself. It must be ready on the instant to organise every department of life on a war basis. Armed forces which have not behind them a resolute community are robbed of more than half their power. A feeling of panic is always apt to infect a democracy, and then under the palsy of fear the tendency is for pressure to be brought to bear on the supreme naval and military authorities, with the result that strategic plans, matured in peace, become confused and ineffective. An illustration of the influence of the fears of the civil population upon war policy was furnished during the Spanish-American War. Under the pressure of nervous public opinion, the Naval Board was compelled to depart from the sound strategy of concentration upon the main objective, and to dissipate no little of the power at its command in order to provide some measure of local protection for various coast towns. Fortunately, British naval policy had been developed on lines which minimised this peril, and our economic resources had been surveyed, and adequate preparations made to afford to our sea power every possible economic support.