In the history of sea power, there is nothing comparable with the strangulation of German oversea shipping in all the seas of the world. It followed almost instantly on the declaration of war. There were over 2,000 German steamers, of nearly 5,000,000 tons gross, afloat when hostilities opened. The German sailing ships--mostly of small size--numbered 2,700. These vessels were distributed over the seas far and wide. Some--scores of them, in fact--were captured, others ran for neutral ports, the sailings of others were cancelled, and the heart of the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating. What must have been the feelings of Herr Ballin and the other pioneers as they contemplated the ruin, at least temporary ruin, of years of splendid enterprise? The strategical advantages enjoyed by England in a war against Germany, lying as she does like a bunker across Germany’s approach to the oversea world, had never been understood by the mass of Germans, nor by their statesmen. Shipowners had some conception of what would happen, but even they did not anticipate that in less than a week the great engine of commercial activity oversea would be brought to a standstill. By its prompt action on the eve of war in instituting a system of Government insurance of war risks, Mr. Asquith’s administration checked any indication of panic among those responsible for our sea affairs. The maintenance of our oversea commerce on the outbreak of hostilities had been the subject of enquiry by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. When war was inevitable, the Government produced this report, and relying on our sea power, immediately carried into effect the far-reaching and statesmanlike recommendations which had been made, for the State itself bearing 80 per cent. of the cost of insurance of hull and cargoes due to capture by the enemies. Thus at the moment of severest strain--the outbreak of war--traders recognised that in carrying on their normal trading operations overseas they had behind them the wholehearted support of the British Government, the power of a supreme fleet, and the guarantee of all the accumulated wealth of the richest country in the world. None of the dismal forebodings which had been indulged in during peace were realised. Traders were convinced by the drastic action of the Government and by the ubiquitous pressure of British sea power on all the trade routes that, though some losses might be suffered owing to the action of German cruisers and converted merchantmen, the danger was of so restricted a character and had been so admirably covered by the Government’s insurance scheme that they could “carry on” in calm courage and thus contribute to the success of British arms. Navies and armies must accept defeat if they have not behind them a civil population freed from fear of starvation.