The corps of salaried soldiers were called Kapu-Kali Odjaks, and their service was centred in the person of their sovereign. They were supposed to be continually ‘at the door of the Sultan’s tent’. The Sultan paid them regularly and personally. They served him regularly and personally. When they went into the field with a commander other than the Sultan, the commander was regarded, during the term of his commission, as in the place of the Sultan.[156] There came to be seven of these _odjaks_: the _janissaries_, the _adjami-oghlular_ (novices), the _topjis_ (field-artillerymen), the _djebedjis_ (smiths), the _toparabadjis_ (artillery and munition drivers), the _khumbaradjis_ (siege-artillerymen), and the _sakkas_ (water-carriers).[157] It is impossible to state just when these distinctive corps arose, but they are the logical development of Orkhan’s _Eulufeli_, the year-in and year-out soldiery who followed arms as a definite profession and enjoyed a regular salary fixed by law. The _akindjis_, cavalry scouts and yet more than that, served as an advance-guard, and opened up the country to be conquered. The greatest dangers and the richest rewards fell to them. They were recruited from among the holders of military fiefs (_timarets_). Guides (tchaousches) and regular paid corps of cavalry (_spahis_) completed the organization. It may be that Orkhan had learned a valuable lesson from his observation of the Catalans and of the early Turkish invaders in Europe. For he arranged his organization in such a way that the army would depend directly upon him, and not upon subordinates who might be led to put their personal interests above those of their chief. With the exception of the _akindjis_, whose loyalty was secured by their fiefs, there were no irregular bands raised and led by adventurers. Unity was the first striking characteristic of the Ottoman army. The second characteristic was readiness. We have already seen how Andronicus III ‘gathered in haste’ the army which he tried to oppose to the Osmanlis. Lack of time for preparation is the excuse for many a Byzantine disaster. An early and competent traveller wrote that the Osmanlis knew beforehand just when the Christian armies were coming and where they could be met to the best advantage. For they were always on a war footing, and their _tchaousches_ and spies knew how and where to lead. ‘They can start suddenly, and a hundred Christian soldiers would make more noise than ten thousand Osmanlis. When the drum is sounded they put themselves immediately in march, never breaking step, never stopping till the word is given. Lightly armed, in one night they travel as far as their Christian adversaries in three days.’[158] VIII