The IIIrd Army, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia, consisted of the Vth and XIth Prussian, and the Ist and IInd Bavarian Corps, the Wuertemberg and Baden Field Divisions, with one Division of cavalry. Its approximate strength was 130,000 men; it was to constitute the left wing, and to concentrate about Landau and Rastatt. The IXth Corps, consisting of the 18th and the Hesse Divisions, was along with the XIIth Royal Saxon Corps to form a reserve of 60,000 men in front of Mayence, for the reinforcement of the IInd Army to a strength of 194,000 men. The three Armies numbered together 384,000 men. There still remained the Ist, IInd, and VIth Corps, numbering 100,000 men; but they were not at first included, as railway transport for them was not available for three weeks to come. The 17th Division and certain bodies of Landwehr troops were detailed to defend the coasts. It is apparent that numerically the German armies were considerably superior to the French. Inclusive of the garrisons and reserves about one million of men and over 200,000 horses were on the ration list. On the night of July 16th the Royal order for mobilization was issued, and when his Majesty arrived in Mayence fourteen days later, he found 300,000 men assembled on the Rhine and beyond. The plan of campaign submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, and accepted by the King, proves that officer to have had his eye fixed, from the first, upon the capture of the enemy's capital, the possession of which is of more importance in France than in other countries. On the way thither the hostile forces were to be driven as persistently as possible back from the fertile southern provinces into the more confined background to the north. But beyond everything the plan of campaign was based on the resolve to attack the enemy at once, wherever found, and keep the German forces always so compact that this could be done with the advantage of superior numbers. The specific dispositions for the accomplishment of those objects were left to be adopted on the spot; the advance to the frontier was alone pre-arranged in every detail. It is a delusion to imagine that a plan of campaign can be laid down far ahead and fulfilled with exactitude. The first collision with the enemy creates a new situation in accordance with its result. Some things intended will have become impracticable; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to form a correct estimate of the circumstances, to decide for the best for the moment, and carry out his purpose unflinchingly.