The Future of International LawOppenheim, L. (Lassa)
History
The Future of International Law
Oppenheim, L. (Lassa)
International law
28. The proposed constitution, further, makes no inroad at all on the
equality of states. This equality is the indispensable foundation of
international society. The idea of equality merely expresses the fact
that in all resolutions of the international society every state,
whatever may be its size and political importance, obtains one voice and
no more than one, that every state can be bound by a resolution only
with its consent, and that no state can exercise jurisdiction over
another state. It does not and cannot express more. In no circumstances
is it to be asserted that unanimity is a condition for all resolutions
of the Conferences, and that all resolutions are void to which one or
more states refuse their consent. Of course, such resolutions bind those
only who assent to them, and of course unanimous resolutions alone can
be considered to be universally binding. But nothing should hinder the
Conferences--and so it happened in the two first Conferences--from
passing majority resolutions. It must never be lost sight of that such
majority resolutions do not go to form a _universal_ but only a
_general_ law of nations. Only he who repudiates the necessary
distinction between a particular and a general and a universal law of
nations can demand unanimity. Now the development which up to the
present has taken place in the law of nations has shown the necessity of
this distinction. It would be extremely difficult to enumerate any large
number of universally accepted rules of the law of nations--apart from
those which have obtained recognition as customary law. We have only to
think of the Declaration of Paris, to which some states still refuse
assent. History also teaches us that the general law of nations has a
tendency gradually to become the universal law of nations. It is
therefore permissible, when a forward step which fails to gain unanimous
approval has become a practical matter, for that majority of states
which is ready for it to take the step by themselves; the dissenting
states will give in their adhesion in course of time. And if and when
this should turn out not to be the case, such a majority resolution
would anyhow represent, in a narrower circle of international society, a
step forward from which there is no obligation to forbear merely because
others are unwilling to join in taking it.
[Sidenote: Absence of any executive power.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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