49. However this may be, the illustration adduced is sufficient proof that the interpretation of international enactments creates a difficulty of its own for international legislation. International legislators must bring even greater solicitude than municipal legislators to the expression of their real meaning in rigid terms. And this aim can only be attained by the most assiduous preparation and consideration of the contents of the enactment. It would be best if these contents were published and thereby submitted to expert discussion before they were finally accepted at the Conferences. The national jurisconsults of the participant states would thus be enabled to criticize the proposals and to indicate the points which especially need clearing up. It might also be possible to consider the enactment, by convention, of an international ordinance containing a series of rules for the interpretation and construction of all international statutes. This much is sure, that the interpretation of international statutes must be freer than that of municipal statutes, and must therefore be directed rather to the spirit of the law than to the meaning of the words used. This is all the more requisite because French legal language is foreign to most of the states concerned, and because it is not to be expected that before ratification they should obtain minute information about the meaning of every single foreign word employed. CHAPTER III INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE [Sidenote: Law can exist without official administration.] 50. It is inherent in the nature of law that it should be put in question whenever from time to time one party raises a claim in the name of the law which the other resists in the name of the same law. If, however, it be asserted that there cannot be any law where there is no official administration of justice, this is a fallacy, and the fallacy lies in considering the presence of the elements of the more perfect situation to be presupposed in the less perfect situation. Beyond a doubt it is the administration of law which gives law the certainty that its authority will in every case obtain operative effect. But this operative effect is obtainable even apart from administration, because those who are subject to the law are in most cases clear as to its contents, and so they raise no question about it, but submit to its application without any need of recourse to jurisdictional officials. All the same, when a dispute does arise, law needs official administration: and, accordingly, in the long run, no highly developed legal society can dispense with it. [Sidenote: The Hague Court of Arbitration as a permanent institution.]