selfishness of the chiefs of the Protestant union formed a greater obstacle to the King of Sweden’s views, than even the weakness of their individual states. Unable, therefore, to obtain the cordial and willing co-operation of those who were linked to him by the bond of a common interest, Gustavus had only the alternative to abandon them to their fate and share the dangers which he sought to obviate, or to take the equivocal and rarely defensible step of occupying their territories and compelling their assistance, an unsolicited, though an honourable and friendly, ally. He chose the latter. The shortest apology for this determination, which as a matter of policy was opposed by Oxenstiern, may be found in the substance of the king’s answer to that minister’s objections, as it is abridged by Schiller in his History of the Thirty Years’ War. “If we wait for the enemy in Sweden, in losing a battle, all is lost: all, on the contrary, is gained if we obtain the first success in Germany. The sea is large, and we have extensive coasts to watch. Should the enemy’s fleet escape us, or our own be beaten, it is not possible for us to prevent a landing. We must therefore use all our efforts for the preservation of Stralsund. So long as this harbour shall be in our power Ave shall maintain the honour of our flag in the Baltic, and shall be able to keep up a free intercourse with Germany. But in order to defend Stralsund we must not shut ourselves up in Sweden; but must pass over with an army into Pomerania. Speak to me then no more of a defensive war, by which we shall lose our most precious advantages. Sweden herself must not behold the standards of the enemy; and, if we are vanquished in Germany, it will still be time enough to have recourse to your plan.”