A daring conception came to his mind, and was rapidly acted upon. Instead of retiring at once to a position of safety, he would first make a swoop upon Soult’s Army, thus threatening the line of Napoleon’s communications with France. And his object in so doing was, simply and definitely, to draw the whole weight of the Conqueror’s fury upon himself and his small British Army, thus relieving the terrible pressure upon the more southern provinces of Spain. It was a startling and a hazardous step. In the hand of any less brilliant and experienced Commander, it might have ended in an awful disaster—in a modern Thermopylæ on a huge scale—in the complete destruction of the entire British force. But Moore knew what he was about. That brought matters to a point. Napoleon had expected, as a matter of course, that Moore would retreat so soon as the Spanish Armies melted away. What else could he do? Napoleon at this date had in Spain not less than 330,000 soldiers, 60,000 horses, and 200 pieces of field artillery. Moore had with him less than 24,000 soldiers, and perhaps another 10,000 in Portugal, including 4,000 in hospital. Then, to Napoleon’s unbounded amazement, he learnt—getting the news on December 21—that, in place of retreating, the puny English force was boldly advancing towards the Douro. The Emperor’s exclamation, as heard by Marshal Ney, and afterwards repeated by him to Major Charles Napier, was— “_Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me! I shall advance against him in person._” * * * * * That Sir John Moore had thoroughly grasped the situation, and that he understood to the full the perils of his position, may be seen from his own letters. As early as the 26th of November, he had written from Salamanca, in confidence, to one of his brothers— “Upon entering Spain, I have found affairs in a very different state from what I expected, or from what they are thought to be in England. I am in a scrape, from which God knows how I am to extricate myself! But, instead of Salamanca, this Army should have been assembled at Seville.” And at the close of a full and clear statement of the whole matter—“I understand all is fear and confusion at Madrid. Tell James it is difficult to judge at a distance. The Spaniards have not shown themselves a wise or a provident people. Their wisdom is not a wisdom of action; but still they are a fine people; a character of their own, quite distinct from other nations; and much might have been done with them. Perhaps they may rouse again. Pray for me, that I may make right decisions. If I make bad ones, it will not be for want of consideration. I sleep little. It is now only five in the morning; and I have concluded, since I got up, this long letter.”