Twenty-three thousand men, with eight or ten thousand more out of reach, opposed to seventy or eighty thousand, with a hundred thousand more within reach! Two thousand cavalry pitted against at least five times their number! A collie-dog snapping at the heels of a Bengal tiger would be no inapt picture of Moore’s desperate daring. Well might he write— “With such a force as mine I can pretend to do no more. It would only be losing this Army to Spain and to England to persevere in my march on Soult; who, if posted strongly, might wait; or, if not, would retire and draw me on until the corps from Madrid got behind me.[5] In short, single-handed, I cannot pretend to contend with the superior numbers the French can bring against me.” There was, indeed, not a moment to be lost. By forced marches and the utmost expedition the first and most perilous stage was accomplished. The River Esla was crossed—and not too soon. Napoleon, pushing furiously forward, bent heart and mind on getting to Benevente before the English, found himself twelve hours too late. Moore had precisely reckoned his time and had neatly baffled Europe’s Conqueror. A few days later, on the 1st of January, 1809, Napoleon underwent a second dire mortification. He reached Astorga, for which he had been aiming, again straining every nerve with the hope of cutting off Moore’s retreat—and as at Esla, he was once more a day too late. A second time Moore had quietly slipped away out of his grasp. While here, Napoleon had unexpected news. He heard of the fresh alliance between Russia and Austria; and he heard that an attack upon France during his absence was being planned. This altered the face of matters. The crushing of Spain, delayed by Moore’s action, had to be put off indefinitely. Napoleon, with a large body of troops, hurried back to Paris. But he left Soult and Ney in command of about sixty thousand men, in two columns, one to attack Moore in rear, the other to take him in flank, while thousands scattered about the country were advancing to support the attack. Enough, in all conscience, one would imagine, to deal with a retreating force of less than twenty-four thousand! (_To be continued._) FOOTNOTES: [1] Fact. [2] At this date Napoleon was already at Vittoria with 170,000 good troops. If the fact was known to the Spaniards, it was carefully concealed by them from the English. [3] Afterwards Marquis of Anglesey. [4] “This Army” (under Moore) “did not exceed twenty-four thousand men, and he was opposed by Napoleon, who had passed the Pyrenees at the head of three hundred and thirty thousand, and could readily bring two hundred and thirty thousand to bear against the British General.”—_Peninsular War_, vol. i., by Sir W. Napier.