The Government of England (Vol. I)Lowell, A. Lawrence (Abbott Lawrence)
History
The Government of England (Vol. I)
Lowell, A. Lawrence (Abbott Lawrence)
Great Britain -- Politics and government
The Treasury Bench is not so omniscient as it appears when answering
questions in the House. After notice of a question has been given, the
materials for a reply are prepared, and often the answer itself is drawn
up, by some permanent official in the department. Sometimes the minister
merely reads the answer as it has been placed in his hands, but more
commonly while keeping the substance, he puts it into words of his own
that he thinks better suited to the temper of the House. The labour of
working up the answers to innumerable questions on every conceivable
subject, and of every degree of importance and triviality, is in the
aggregate very great, and places a heavy burden upon the permanent
officials during the session of Parliament. But no satisfactory method
of limiting the privilege has yet been devised, and although abused, it
has the effect of keeping the administration up to the mark. The system
affords an opportunity for constant public criticism, and while it gives
the permanent officials some control over the minister, it is, on the
other hand, a most effective means of preventing the growth of a
bureaucratic spirit.
[Sidenote: Evils where a Minister is Inactive.]
If the permanent officials can restrain a minister from interfering
overmuch, there is no similar means of preventing him from neglecting
his duties. Yet in that case the service suffers. It is apt to become
numbed and bureaucratic. Permanent officials tend to follow precedent,
and, indeed, the force of precedent furnishes the basis of their power,
but the tendency to be too rigid in their rules is the curse of all
their tribe. They shrink from innovation, rarely making a new precedent
themselves. This is particularly true in the lesser offices, giving
rise, at times, to complaint; and the political chief has to insist upon
the need of making exceptions in hard cases, without allowing the hard
cases themselves to make bad law. The surest remedy for an excess of
routine is a parliamentary head who is interested in the department, and
with him a permanent under-secretary of large calibre and wide
experience in affairs.
[Sidenote: Influence of Permanent Officials not Increasing.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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