The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and workJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and work
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
Great Britain. Royal Navy; Jutland, Battle of, 1916; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader
of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been
passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy
ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard
for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle
cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing
N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle
Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the
_Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_.
The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_
with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead
of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light
cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing
so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser
Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about
W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels.
In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four
British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was
apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the
Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action;
the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken
by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made
in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted
at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or
north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High
Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.
So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time,
the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course
before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually
hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then,
to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was
being steered_.
The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser
engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.
The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the
_Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser
Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been
another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took
place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening
fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser
Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about
5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly
possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed,
that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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