Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, had sighted the _Marlborough_ at 6.6 P.M. and the remainder of the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet a little later. Not seeing any other columns, he concluded that the _Marlborough_ was leading the whole line, and decided to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 P.M., however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral Evan-Thomas realised that the Fleet was deploying to port, the 6th Division being the starboard wing column. He then determined to make a large turn of his squadron to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, which by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle. During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s leading battleships, but the shooting was not good, and our vessels received little injury. Unfortunately, however, the helm of the _Warspite_ jammed, and that ship, continuing her turn through sixteen points came under a very heavy fire and received considerable injury. The disabled _Warrior_ happened to be in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the _Warspite_ had the effect for the moment of diverting attention from the _Warrior_, so that the latter vessel got clear. The _Warspite_ was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts from an unpleasant position and was steered to the northward to make good damages, and eventually, in accordance with directions from Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, returned independently to Rosyth, considerably down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not much injured. By 6.38 P.M. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were in station astern of the _Agincourt_ (1st Battle Squadron), the last ship of the line. At 6.33 P.M., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed clear, the speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 knots, and this speed was subsequently maintained. The reduction of speed to 14 knots during the deployment caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers had formed ahead. Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity for keeping a reserve of some three knots of speed in hand in the case of a long line of ships, in order to allow of station being kept in the line under conditions of action, when ships were making alterations of course to throw out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent action on the part of single ships, or of divisions of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid excessive smoke from the funnels; for this reason the Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots. The experience of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for this reserve. [Illustration: _Plan 8_ _APPROXIMATE_ POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON 31st. MAY 1916.]