The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and workJellicoe, John Rushworth
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The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and work
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
Great Britain. Royal Navy; Jutland, Battle of, 1916; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on May 31st,
being only some three or four miles, and I considered it desirable
under these conditions, and in view of the fact that I was not in
touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger
of submarine attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the
enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th Division of the
Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, having dropped astern during
the night owing to the reduction in speed of the _Marlborough_ and
the change of flag from the _Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_. Partly on
account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable
difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements
during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was
experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to
the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose
facilities for computing their positions under these conditions
were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all
classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any
surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M., the destroyers
did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the
Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron, was not
in company until the evening.
The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly
the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for
the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my
intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night.
It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the
destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was
effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for
the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields
in the early morning on the way to their ports. The presence of a
Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 A.M., made it certain that our position at
that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the
information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the
early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed
the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daylight.
At 3 A.M. the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, which was lying disabled in Lat.
55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light cruiser two miles to
the eastward, steaming slowly to the northward. After being in sight
for about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, bows
first. The _Sparrowhawk_ was subsequently sighted by the _Marksman_ and
others of our destroyers, and, being too seriously damaged for towing
back to a base, was sunk by the _Marksman_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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