The _Second_, or Channel Fleet, included the older battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of the Grand Fleet. Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command on September 3rd, 1914. The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subsequently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and three of them, the _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, were sunk whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast. These, then, were the conditions when War opened. It was only natural that war experience should show very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast, or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new arrangements. Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a substitute for war experience. They are many factors which render peace manœuvres unreal. In the first place, the available ships have to be divided so as to form the opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both _matériel_ and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships; finally, in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting weapon. But, more than all, it was the conditions under which war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation. (_a_) The submarine had just become a most formidable weapon; its development during the War was extraordinarily rapid. (_b_) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the start, but it also developed with great rapidity, as did the heavier-than-air machines. (_c_) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed by the enemy, both defensively and offensively. (_d_) The effective range both of the gun and of the torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had been considered possible before the War.[C] (_e_) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.