The Battle Orders indicated the position to be occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle memorandum which I had prepared when in command, first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations and additions necessary, and the Orders were under constant revision. The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible. Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after deployment control the movements of all the squadrons comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, and increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity for wide decentralisation of command, _after the deployment_ of the fleet for action, was emphasised. As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be able to interpret my wishes when acting independently. Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that squadrons could conform to his movements. The general lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These included the range at which it was intended to open the engagement, the range below which it was not intended to close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own torpedoes when opportunity occurred. After the experience of the engagement on January 24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines and torpedoes, _since a retiring fleet is in a position of great tactical advantage in the employment of these weapons_. The Tactical Board was in constant use for a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the other flag officers.