The Granite Monthly. Vol. II. No. 7. Apr., 1879: A New Hampshire Magazine devoted to Literature, History, and State Progress — John Shaqi
The Granite Monthly. Vol. II. No. 7. Apr., 1879: A New Hampshire Magazine devoted to Literature, History, and State ProgressVarious
History
The Granite Monthly. Vol. II. No. 7. Apr., 1879: A New Hampshire Magazine devoted to Literature, History, and State Progress
Various
New Hampshire -- History -- Periodicals
victories may be accredited to this fact, if it is a fact? But our
commanders, instead of trusting their men, either kept them in utter
ignorance of movements or foolishly deceived them. How well I remember
at the battle of Gaines’s Hill, where Jackson thrashed Porter so
soundly, and Sykes’s regulars failed to stand their ground, that the
story was industriously circulated along the thinned but unbroken ranks
of Bartlett’s Brigade, “McClellan’s in Richmond, boys. One more effort
and the day is ours!” And Meagher’s Irish Brigade, hastening to our
relief on the run, took up the cry and put on so determined a front that
Jackson’s veterans halted and reformed, giving our officers time to
re-establish their broken lines and hold their ground until night came
down and afforded them an opportunity to withdraw to the left bank of
the Chickahominy,—not to enter Richmond, but to begin that celebrated
“flank movement” which ended at Harrison’s Landing. Again, at second
Bull Run, when, after dawdling along all day on the road from Alexandria
to Centreville, with the sounds of conflict in our front (making a long
two hours’ rest at Annandale, and then marching at full speed in a hot
sun), we reached Centreville, we were told that Pope had whipped
Jackson, and that Lee with his whole army was in full retreat. But when
we reached Bull Run, “Linden saw another sight.” Heavens, what a
stampede! McDowell’s and Sigel’s corps in disastrous retreat,—cavalry,
artillery, infantry, ammunition and baggage wagons in one confused,
struggling mass, intent upon reaching the heights of Centreville. Our
corps (Franklin’s, 6th) had just halted to rest, as the stragglers came
into view. Deploying, we stopped the rout, and ended the retreat.
Seizing the infantry stragglers, we placed them in our own ranks until
our brigade swelled to twice its usual size. Night closed in, and we
were marched to the front across Cub Run, and ordered to hold our
position at all hazards. In that march every straggler deserted! Poor
fellows, who could blame them? Had they been killed then and there who
could have accounted for them? Most of them returned to their own
regiments and thereafter did good service no doubt. Panics are liable to
seize upon the best of troops. I cite these instances as partial
corroboration of my point. What wonder if our troops came to distrust
all reports and to depend only upon established facts. But perhaps our
commanders were right in concealing information from the army in
general, and Moore may have hit the nail on the head when he wrote:
“A captain has been known to think,
Even colonels have been heard to reason;
And reasoners whether clad in pink,
Or red or blue, are on the brink,
Nine cases out of ten—of treason.”
At any rate they conducted the war in harmony with such a belief.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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