The Great Fortress : A chronicle of Louisbourg 1720-1760Wood, William
History
The Great Fortress : A chronicle of Louisbourg 1720-1760
Wood, William
Louisbourg (N.S.) -- History -- Siege, 1745; Louisbourg (N.S.) -- History -- Siege, 1758
But, after all, it was not so much the defective works
that really mattered as the defective garrison behind
them. English-speaking civilians who have written about
Louisbourg have sometimes taken partial account of the
ordinary Frenchman's repugnance to oversea duty in time
of peace and of the little worth of hireling foreigners
in time of war. But they have always ignored that steady
drip, drip, drip of deterioration which reduces the
efficiency of every garrison condemned to service in
remote and thoroughly uncongenial countries. Louisbourg
was remote, weeks away from exchanges with Quebec, months
from exchanges with any part of France or Switzerland.
And what other foreign station could have been more
thoroughly uncongenial, except, perhaps, a convict station
in the tropics? Bad quarters were endurable in Paris or
even in the provinces, where five minutes' walk would
take one into something pleasanter. Bad fortifications
would inspire less apprehension anywhere in France, where
there was at least an army always ready to take the field.
But cold, cramped quarters in foggy little Louisbourg,
between the estranging sea and an uncouth land of rock,
bog, sand, and scrubby vegetation, made all the world of
difference in the soldier's eyes. Add to this his want
of faith in works which he saw being scamped by rascally
contractors, and we can begin to understand why the
general attitude of town and garrison alike was one of
'Here to-day and gone to-morrow.'
CHAPTER II
THE SEA LINK LOST
1745
Rome would not rest till she had ruined Carthage. Britain
would not rest till she had seen Dunkirk demolished. New
England would not rest till she had taken Louisbourg.
Louisbourg was unique in all America, and that was its
undoing. It was the one sentinel beside the gateway to
New France; therefore it ought to be taken before Quebec
and Canada were attacked. It was the one corsair lying
in perpetual wait beside the British lines of seaborne
trade; therefore it must be taken before British shipping
could be safe. It was the one French sea link between
the Old World and the New; therefore its breaking was of
supreme importance. It was the one real fortress ever
heard of in America, and it was in absolutely alien hands;
therefore, so ran New England logic, it was most offensive
to all true Britons, New Englanders, and Puritans; to
all rivals in smuggling, trade, and privateering; and to
all right-thinking people generally.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account