The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage — John Shaqi
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National AdvantageAngell, Norman
History
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
Angell, Norman
Commercial policy; Disarmament; Imperialism; War; War, Cost of
That is why it is that the peace propaganda has so signally failed, and
why the public opinion of the countries of Europe, far from restraining
the tendency of their Governments to increase armaments, is pushing them
into still greater expenditure. It is universally assumed that national
power means national wealth, national advantage; that expanding
territory means increased opportunity for industry; that the strong
nation can guarantee opportunities for its citizens that the weak nation
cannot. The Englishman, for instance, believes that his wealth is
largely the result of his political power, of his political domination,
mainly of his sea power; that Germany with her expanding population must
feel cramped; that she must fight for elbow-room; and that if he does
not defend himself he will illustrate that universal law which makes of
every stomach a graveyard. He has a natural preference for being the
diner rather than the dinner. As it is universally admitted that wealth
and prosperity and well-being go with strength and power and national
greatness, he intends, so long as he is able, to maintain that strength
and power and greatness, and not to yield it even in the name of
altruism. And he will not yield it, because should he do so it would be
simply to replace British power and greatness by the power and greatness
of some other nation, which he feels sure would do no more for the
well-being of civilization as a whole than he is prepared to do. He is
persuaded that he can no more yield in the competition of armaments,
than as a business man or as a manufacturer he could yield in commercial
competition to his rival; that he must fight out his salvation under
conditions as he finds them, since he did not make them, and since he
cannot change them.
Admitting his premises--and these premises are the universally accepted
axioms of international politics the world over--who shall say that he
is wrong?
CHAPTER II
THE AXIOMS OF MODERN STATECRAFT
Are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?--Some typical statements
of them--German dreams of conquest--Mr. Frederic Harrison on
results of defeat of British arms and invasion of England--Forty
millions starving.
Are the axioms set out in the last chapter unchallengeable?
Is it true that the wealth, prosperity and well-being of a nation depend
upon its military power, or have necessarily anything whatever to do
therewith?
Can one civilized nation gain moral or material advantage by the
military conquest of another?
Does conquered territory add to the wealth of the conquering nation?
Is it possible for a nation to "own" the territory of another in the way
that a person or corporation would "own" an estate?
Could Germany "take" English trade and Colonies by military force?
Could she turn English Colonies into German ones, and win an overseas
empire by the sword, as England won hers in the past?
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