We have here, at present in merely embryonic form, a group of motives otherwise opposed, but meeting and agreeing upon one point: the organization of society on other than territorial and national divisions. When motives of such breadth as these give force to a tendency, it may be said that the very stars in their courses are working to the same end. PART III THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME CHAPTER I THE RELATION OF DEFENCE TO AGGRESSION Necessity for defence arises from the existence of a motive for attack--Platitudes that everyone overlooks--To attenuate the motive for aggression is to undertake a work of defence. The general proposition embodied in this book--that the world has passed out of that stage of development in which it is possible for one civilized group to advance its well-being by the military domination of another--is either broadly true or broadly false. If it is false, it can, of course, have no bearing upon the actual problems of our time, and can have no practical outcome; huge armaments tempered by warfare are the logical and natural condition. But the commonest criticism this book has had to meet is that, though its central proposition is in essence sound, it has, nevertheless, no practical value, because-- 1. Armaments are for defence, not for aggression. 2. However true these principles may be, the world does not recognize them and never will, because men are not guided by reason. As to the first point. It is probable that, if we really understood truths which we are apt to dismiss as platitudes, many of our problems would disappear. To say, "We must take measures for defence" is equivalent to saying, "Someone is likely to attack us," which is equivalent to saying, "Someone has a motive for attacking us." In other words, the basic fact from which arises the necessity for armaments, the ultimate explanation of European militarism, is _the force of the motive making for aggression_. (And in the word "aggression," of course, I include the imposition of superior force by the _threat_, or implied threat, of its use, as well as by its actual use.) That motive may be material or moral; it may arise from real conflict of interest, or a purely imaginary one; but with the disappearance of prospective aggression disappears also the need for defence. The reader deems these platitudes beside the mark? I will take a few sample criticisms directed at this book. Here is the London _Daily Mail_: The bigger nations are armed, not so much because they look for the spoils of war, as because they wish to prevent the horrors of it; arms are for defence.[111] And here is the London _Times_: No doubt the victor suffers, but who suffers most, he or the vanquished?"[112]