The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National AdvantageAngell, Norman
History
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
Angell, Norman
Commercial policy; Disarmament; Imperialism; War; War, Cost of
The criticism of the _Daily Mail_ was made within three months of a
"raging and tearing" big navy campaign, all of it based on the
assumption that Germany _was_ "looking for the spoils of war," the
English naval increase being thus a direct outcome of such motives.
Without it, the question of English increase would not have arisen.[113]
The only justification for the clamor for increase was that England was
liable to _attack_; every nation in Europe justifies its armaments in
the same way; every nation consequently believes in the universal
existence of this motive for attack.
The _Times_ has been hardly less insistent than the _Mail_ as to the
danger from German aggression; but its criticism would imply that the
motive behind that prospective aggression is not a desire for any
political advantage or gain of any sort. Germany apparently recognizes
aggression to be, not merely barren of any useful result whatsoever, but
burdensome and costly into the bargain; she is, nevertheless, determined
to enter upon it in order that though she suffer, someone else will
suffer more![114]
In common with the London _Daily Mail_ and the London _Times_, Admiral
Mahan fails to understand this "platitude," which underlies the relation
of defence to aggression.
Thus in his criticism of this book, he cites the position of Great
Britain during the Napoleonic era as proof that commercial advantage
goes with the possession of preponderant military power in the following
passage:
Great Britain owed her commercial superiority then to the armed
control of the sea, which had sheltered her commerce and
industrial fabric from molestation by the enemy.
_Ergo_, military force has commercial value, a result which is arrived
at by this method: in deciding a case made up of two parties you ignore
one.
England's superiority was not due to the employment of military force,
but to the fact that she was able to prevent the employment of military
force against her; and the necessity for so doing arose from Napoleon's
motive in threatening her. But for the existence of this motive to
aggression--moral or material, just or mistaken--Great Britain, without
any force whatsoever, would have been more secure and more prosperous
than she was; she would not have been spending a third of her income in
war, and her peasantry would not have been starving.
Of a like character to the remark of the _Times_ is the criticism of the
_Spectator_, as follows:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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