The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National AdvantageAngell, Norman
History
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
Angell, Norman
Commercial policy; Disarmament; Imperialism; War; War, Cost of
In this matter it seems fatally easy to secure either one of two kinds
of action: that of the "practical man" who limits his energies to
securing a policy which will perfect the machinery of war and disregard
anything else; or that of the Pacifist, who, persuaded of the brutality
or immorality of war, is apt to deprecate effort directed at
self-defence. What is needed is the type of activity which will include
both halves of the problem: provision for education, for a Political
Reformation in this matter, _as well as_ such means of defence as will
meantime counterbalance the existing impulse to aggression. To
concentrate on either half to the exclusion of the other half is to
render the whole problem insoluble.
What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the
"practical man," and limit their energies simply and purely to piling up
armaments?
A British critic once put to me what he evidently deemed a poser: "Do
you urge that we shall be stronger than our enemy, or weaker?"
To which I replied: "The last time that question was asked me was in
Berlin, by Germans. What would you have had me reply to those
Germans?"--a reply which, of course, meant this: In attempting to find
the solution of this question in terms of one party, you are attempting
the impossible. The outcome will be war, and war would not settle it. It
would all have to be begun over again.
The British Navy League catechism says: "Defence consists in being so
strong that it will be dangerous for your enemy to attack you."[115] Mr.
Churchill, even, goes farther than the Navy League, and says: "The way
to make war impossible is to make victory certain."
The Navy League definition is at least possible of application to
practical politics, because rough equality of the two parties would make
attack by either dangerous. Mr. Churchill's principle is impossible of
application to practical politics, because it could only be applied by
one party, and would, in the terms of the Navy League principle, deprive
the other party of the right of defence. As a matter of simple fact,
both the British Navy League, by its demand for two ships to one, and
Mr. Churchill, by his demand for certain victory, deny in this matter
Germany's right to defend herself; and such denial is bound, on the part
of a people animated by like motives to themselves, to provoke a
challenge. When the British Navy League says, as it does, that a
self-respecting nation should not depend upon the goodwill of foreigners
for its safety, but upon its own strength, it recommends Germany to
maintain her efforts to arrive at some sort of equality with England.
When Mr. Churchill goes farther, and says that a nation is entitled to
be so strong as to make victory over its rivals certain, he knows that
if Germany were to adopt his own doctrine, its certain outcome would be
war.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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