The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National AdvantageAngell, Norman
History
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
Angell, Norman
Commercial policy; Disarmament; Imperialism; War; War, Cost of
It is impossible for governments to base their normal policies on
conceptions which are in advance of the general standard of the
political opinion of the people from whom they derive their power. The
average man will, it is true, quite readily subscribe abstractly to a
peace ideal, just as he will subscribe abstractly to certain religious
ideals--to take no thought for the morrow, not to save up treasure upon
earth--without the faintest notion of making them a guide of conduct,
or, indeed, of seeing how they _can_ be a guide of conduct. At peace
meetings he will cheer lustily and sign petitions, because he believes
Peace to be a great moral idea, and that armies, like the Police, are
destined to disappear one day--on about the same day in his belief--when
the nature of man shall have been altered.
One may be able fully to appreciate this attitude of the "average
sensual man" without doubting the least in the world the sincerity,
genuineness, wholeheartedness of these emotional movements in favor of
peace, which from time to time sweep over a country (as on the occasion
of the Taft-Grey exchange of views on arbitration). But what it is
necessary to emphasize, what cannot be too often reiterated, is that
these movements, however emotional and sincere, are not movements which
can lead to breaking up the intellectual basis of the policy which
produces armaments in the Western World. These movements embrace only
one section of the factors making for peace--the moral and the
emotional. And while those factors have immense power, they are
uncertain and erratic in their operation, and when the shouting dies and
there is a natural reaction from emotion, and it is a question once more
of doing the humdrum week-day work of the world, of pushing our
interests, of finding markets, of achieving the best possible generally
for our nation as against other nations, of preparing for the future, of
organizing one's efforts, the old code of compromise between the ideal
and the necessary will be as operative as ever. So long as his notions
of what war can accomplish in an economic or commercial sense remain
what they are, the average man will not deem that his prospective enemy
is likely to make the peace ideal a guide of conduct. Incidentally he
would be right. At the bottom of his mind--and I say this not lightly
and as a guess, but as an absolute conviction after very close
observation--the ideal of peace is conceived as a demand that he weaken
his own defences on no better assurance than that his prospective rival
or enemy will be well-behaved and not wicked enough to attack him.
It appeals to him as about equivalent to asking that he shall not lock
his doors because to suppose people will rob him is to have a low view
of human nature!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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