The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National AdvantageAngell, Norman
History
The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage
Angell, Norman
Commercial policy; Disarmament; Imperialism; War; War, Cost of
The German economist Max Wirth ("Geschichte der Handelskrisen")
expressed in 1874 his astonishment at France's financial and industrial
recovery: "The most striking example of the economic force of the
country is shown by the exports, which rose immediately after the
signature of peace, despite a war which swallowed a hundred thousand
lives and more than ten milliards (two billion dollars)." A similar
conclusion is drawn by Professor Biermer ("Fürst Bismarck als
Volkswirt"), who indicates that the Protectionist movement in 1879 was
to a large extent due to the result of the payment of the indemnity.
This disturbance of the balance of trade, however, was only one factor
among several: the financial disorganization, a fictitious expansion of
expenditure creating a morbid speculation, precipitated the worst
financial crisis in Germany which she has known in modern times.
Monsieur Lavisse summarizes the experience thus:
Enormous sums of money were lost. If one takes the aggregate of
the securities quoted on the Berlin Bourse, railroad, mining
and industrial securities generally, it is by thousands of
millions of marks that one must estimate the value of such
securities in 1870 and 1871. But a large number of enterprises
were started in Germany of which the Berlin Bourse knew
nothing. Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Leipzig, Breslau,
Stuttgart, had all their local groups of speculative
securities; hundreds of millions must be added to the thousands
of millions. These differences did not represent merely a
transfer of wealth, for a great proportion of the capital sunk
was lost altogether, having been eaten up in ill-considered and
unattractive expenditure.... There can be no sort of doubt that
the money lost in these worthless enterprises constitutes an
absolute loss for Germany.
The decade from 1870-1880 was for France a great recuperative period,
although for several other nations in Europe it was one of great
depression, notably, after the "boom" of 1872, for Germany. No less an
authority than Bismarck himself testifies to the double fact. We know
that Bismarck was astonished and dismayed by seeing the regeneration of
France after the war taking place more rapidly and more completely than
the regeneration of Germany. This weighed so heavily upon his mind that
in introducing his Protectionist Bill in 1879 he declared that Germany
was "slowly bleeding to death," and that if the present process were
continued she would find herself ruined. Speaking in the Reichstag on
May 2, 1879, he said:
We see that France manages to support the present difficult
business situation of the civilized world better than we do;
that her Budget has increased since 1871 by a milliard and a
half, and that thanks not only to loans; we see that she has
more resources than Germany, and that, in short, over there
they complain less of bad times.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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