The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
them an infinitely greater stake in the perilous game than the three
hundred Spartans and their attendant Helots did to Sparta.
But in one important respect the official Spartan version failed
conspicuously to have the effect which it was doubtless intended
to convey. The Greek did not at this or any other time allow his
admiration of the national character of the Spartan to warp his
judgment with regard to the Spartan government. He was perfectly well
aware that the personal bravery of the Spartans in the field stood in
strong contrast to the pusillanimity of the policy of their rulers. If
he had any illusions on the subject at the beginning of the war, the
events of the war itself were strikingly calculated to disillusion him.
There can be no possible question as to the personal bravery of the
Spartans in every action, whether on land or sea, in so far as pure
fighting qualities are concerned; there can be no question as to the
greatness of the Spartan contribution to the final result; but Sparta
got little credit for the result in after-time.
It is impossible to close this chapter without making some attempt
to form an estimate of the mental attitude with which Leonidas faced
the situation in which he found himself involved on the morning of
the final struggle in the pass. It is necessary, in examining the
popular story, to remember that Leonidas’ conduct is not represented
as a sacrifice to the stern duty imposed by Spartan discipline, but to
one of the alternatives put forward on the authority of an oracular
response. There was possibly a tinge of fatalism about the character
of the man which lent a colouring to the tale of his death current
at the time. He died, so it was said, to save his country, not from
actual, but from predicted disaster. If this was the case, it is
quite comprehensible that his Spartan bodyguard should be involved
in the fate of their master. To them Spartan law and custom made the
consequences of desertion worse than death. But, leaving the Theban
contingent out of the question, what, under the circumstances, could
possibly have induced the Thespians to involve themselves in the fate
of one who was sacrificing himself to a prediction which did not
concern them? What possible feeling, sentimental or practical,
could have prompted them to share the fate of a self-doomed man? That
was the weak spot in the Spartan version of Thermopylæ. No attempt
was made to explain it. The hypothesis which lay at the root of the
story made it inexplicable. Nor does it seem to have struck those
who invented this story, that under the theory put forward by them,
Leonidas, without any motive whatsoever, deliberately allowed 700
devoted men of a little Bœotian city to share a doom which was his and
his alone.
Leonidas died a nobler death than that. It was with the grander courage
of reason that he faced the terrible odds against him on that last day
of his life.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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