The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
The fighting of the previous days had shown him the strength of the
position which he held at the middle gate. It was a desperate risk; but
there was just the possibility that by detaching half his force to stop
the encircling body of the foe in the difficult path which they were
travelling, he might still be able to maintain the pass, and if he did
maintain it he would do his country an inestimable service. It was thus
with half his little army that he deliberately chose to face an enemy
one hundred times his own numerical strength. He took a risk of whose
magnitude he must have been well aware, to win, in case of success,
a prize of incalculable greatness. He cannot have deluded himself,
he may be pardoned if he deluded his allies—as to the overwhelming
nature of the chances against them. He might have retreated. There
is an exaggerated tendency to assume that Spartan discipline at this
time forbade a commander, under any circumstances, to withdraw from a
position once taken up. Artemisium and, above all, Platæa, prove this
not to have been the case. He was under no such compulsion. What he
did dare to do was to face odds such as men had never faced before and
never have faced since, because by so doing he had a possible prospect
of conferring a service of enormous value on his country. He did this,
too, in spite of that bitter feeling of his countrymen’s desertion
which must have been present in his mind. Nor was the nobility of
his death marred by a useless sacrifice of the lives of devoted men.
#ORIGIN OF HERODOTUS’ VERSION.# Great as was the risk, the greatness
of the end to be attained in case of success justified his
associating others with himself in the desperate venture.
I have laid aside this account of Thermopylæ for some months, in order
to consider whether any other more reasonable explanation of the
circumstances might be drawn from Herodotus’ narrative of _facts_.
I do not, however, see any possibility of arriving at any other
conclusion from them, when taken in combination with the topographical
evidence, which happens in this case to be very clear. There was
certainly a possibility of defending the pass, even after Hydarnes had
forced the path. It may have been remote; but it existed all the same.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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