The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographicalGrundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
History
The great Persian War and its preliminaries : $b A study of the evidence, literary and topographical
Grundy, G. B. (George Beardoe)
Greece -- History -- Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C.
#REPORTED BRIBERY OF THEMISTOCLES.#
There is no trace whatever in the Thermopylæ story of a message having
been received from the fleet advising the garrison of its intended
withdrawal. That may be attributed to the incompleteness of the
story itself. This explanation, however, can hardly be considered
satisfactory in view of the fact that, had anything of the kind
occurred, such an incident would hardly have been omitted from a
version the main object of which was to depict the disaster as an act
of deliberate self-sacrifice on the part of Leonidas.
The decisive factor in the situation was that, bribed or not,
Eurybiades and Adeimantos could not possibly leave the Thermopylæ
garrison in the lurch.[134] The real significance in this, as in the
other similar stories in Herodotus relating to this time, is that it
brings into relief the existence of a strong party within the fleet
which was wholly opposed to the Northern policy. It also for the first
time indicates the part which Corinth seems’ to have played in the
war as the leader of this party of opposition to the Athenian policy.
Thus far it is reliable. The rest of the tale is, as has been said,
suspicious to the last degree,—suspicious, in what may be called its
local colouring,—suspicious, owing to the appalling recklessness of the
assertions which Greek politicians did not hesitate to make respecting
their political opponents.
◆Diod. xi. 12.◆
Diodorus’ version of Artemisium presents so many marked differences
to that of Herodotus, that it is impossible to suppose that it is
either drawn from Herodotus, or even derived from a common source.
There is absolutely no hint of bribery in it, nor, indeed, is there
any reference to the restiveness of the Peloponnesian contingent. What
is emphasized is the fact that Themistocles’ personal influence in the
fleet, and especially with Eurybiades, was very great, and that he was
the _de facto_ commander. There is no tendency to belittle the services
of Athens, though her claims to merit are put upon a different basis.
It is probable, then, that the Greek fleet, after its return
to Artemisium on that sixteenth day, did not face the situation with
a unanimous determination to make a stubborn fight of it. It would
have been surprising had unanimity prevailed, since the circumstances
as they stood, and as they were intended to stand, at Thermopylæ
cannot possibly have been a secret to members of the Peloponnesian
contingents. Still, so long as Leonidas remained there, the strait had
to be defended.
The Persians at Aphetæ were animated by very different feelings. ◆H.
viii. 6.◆ The Greek fleet was not to be defeated merely, but to be
captured. ◆17th day.◆ It was determined to despatch a large squadron,
◆H. viii. 7.◆ two hundred in number, to circumnavigate Eubœa, and to
block the South Euripus.[135]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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