In his private interview with Eurybiades, Themistocles, so he says, adopted as his own the argument suggested by Mnesiphilos, and with its aid so far persuaded that much vexed but apparently honest patriot of the inadvisability of the decision to which the Council of War had recently come, that he consented to call another meeting to reconsider the subject. This was the famous meeting at which the fate of Greece was decided; and it may be regarded as certain that, as is invariably the case with the crises of great historical tragedies, later tradition did not allow the incidents of the situation to lose dramatic force in the telling. Though the dramatic element is not absent from Herodotus’ version, it gives a strong impression of being in the main a true account of what took place. The historian seems to have exercised a powerful self-control over himself in writing the account of what he knew well to have been the most critical moment in the history of his race; and he has, in consequence, succeeded in making his description of this gathering of the Greek commanders one of the most striking pictures in his history. ◆H. viii. 59.◆ “And when they had assembled, before Eurybiades put the question about which he had called the generals together, Themistocles spoke long and earnestly. As he was speaking the Corinthian commander, Adeimantos, the son of Okytos, said: ‘At the games, Themistocles, those who start too soon are scourged.’ But he, justifying his action, answered, ‘Yes, and those left at the post do not win the prize.’ On this occasion his retort to the Corinthian was mild in character; but to Eurybiades he did not use his previous arguments, to the effect that the fleet, if it left Salamis, would disperse; for in the presence of the allies it did not become him to accuse any one. #COUNCIL OF WAR AT SALAMIS.# He relied on a different argument, and spoke as follows: ‘The salvation of Greece is in your hands if you be persuaded by me to remain and give battle in this place, and do not yield to those here present who urge you to remove the fleet to the Isthmus. Hear now and judge between the two plans. If you engage off the Isthmus you will fight in the open sea, and it is highly inexpedient for us to put out thither, because our ships are heavier and fewer in number; and, again, you will lose Salamis, Megara, and Ægina, even if we are successful in other respects. For the Persians’ land army will accompany their fleet, and so you will be responsible for bringing them to the Peloponnese, and will place the whole of Greece in peril. But if you do as I say, you will find the following great advantages in my plan. In the first place, by engaging in the strait with few ships against many, we shall win a great victory, if the war takes the course that may be expected; for it is in our favour to fight in the narrow seas, just as it is in their favour to fight in the open. Again Salamis, in