"(German) Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration, and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable."[25] Again, on July 29, 1914, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported:-- "I was sent for again to-day by the Imperial Chancellor, who told me that he regretted to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that events had marched too rapidly and that it was therefore too late to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of discussion."[26] _(IV.)--Germany asked to State any Form which Mediation between Russia and Austria-Hungary might take._ How Germany endeavoured to shuffle out of the suggested mediation by the four Powers on the plea that the "form" was not one which Austria-Hungary could accept, is set forth in a Telegram from Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin, dated July 29, 1914:-- "The German Government ... seemed to think the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations à quatre in London too formal a method. I urged that the German Government should suggest _any method_ by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operation by _any method that Germany could suggest_ if mine was not acceptable. _In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace._"[27] Here again Germany evaded the point, as is shown in the Telegram from the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 30, 1914:-- "The Chancellor told me last night that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise."[28]