"To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy; "To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto." In effect Austria wished to force Serbia (_a_) to admit a guilt which was not hers; (_b_) to condemn officers in her army without trial at Austria's direction[3]; (_c_) to allow Austrian delegates to dispense such justice in Serbian Courts as they might think fit. In other words, Serbia was to lose her independence as a Sovereign State. And to all these claims Austria demanded an acceptance within 48 hours--until 6 p.m. on July 25, 1914. Yet, in spite of this, Serbia, within the specified time, sent her reply[4], which amounted to an acceptance of Austria's demands, subject, on certain points, to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her Constitution, and subject to an explanation by Austria-Hungary of her precise wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Serbian judicial proceedings. The reply went far beyond anything which any Power--Germany not excepted--had ever thought probable. But the same day the British Ambassador at Vienna reported that the tone of the Austrian press left the impression that a settlement was not desired, and he later reported that the impression left on his mind was that the Austrian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable. In spite of the conciliatory nature of Serbia's reply, the Austrian Minister withdrew from Belgrade the same evening, and Serbia was left with no option but to order a general mobilisation. An outline of the Serbian reply had been communicated to Sir E. Grey an hour or two before it was delivered. He immediately expressed to Germany the hope that she would urge Austria to accept it. Berlin contented itself with "passing on" the expression of Sir E. Grey's hope to Vienna through the German Ambassador there. The fate of the message so passed on may be guessed from the fact that the German Ambassador told the British Ambassador directly afterwards that Serbia had only made a pretence of giving way, and that her concessions were all a sham. As Sir Edward Grey told the German Ambassador on one occasion "the Serbian reply went farther than could have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary of State has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian Note that Serbia could hardly be expected to accept."[5]