"I have had another visit from the German Ambassador this morning; he told me that he had no communication or official proposal to make to me, but that he came, as on the evening before, to talk over the situation and the methods to be employed to avoid action which would be irreparable. When I asked him about Austria's intentions, he declared that he did not know them and was ignorant of the nature of the means of coercion which she was preparing."[100] But how does this compare with the following extract from a telegram sent the next day (July 29) by the Kaiser to the Tsar:-- "I cannot ... consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an 'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are entirely unreliable."[101] On July 29 the French Minister at Brussels reported:-- "I report the following impressions of my interview with M. Davignon and with several persons in a position to have exact information. The attitude of Germany is enigmatical and justifies every apprehension; it seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous arrangement with the Emperor William. "The German Government stand 'with grounded arms' ready to take peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require, but there is so much anxiety everywhere that a sudden intervention against us would not surprise anybody here. My Russian and English colleagues share this feeling."[102] Finally, on July 30, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador in Vienna, stated to Sir Edward Grey:-- ="I have private information that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it was despatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it."=[103] Confirmation of the whole evidence is found in the commercial world, for as Sir E. H. Holden, Chairman of the London City and Midland Bank, stated on January 29, 1915:-- "On the 18th of July last (1914) the Dresdner Bank caused a great commotion by selling its securities and by advising its clients to sell their securities. This was recognised as the first semi-official intimation of a probable European conflagration...." FOOTNOTES: [84] Cd. 7717, No. 19. [85] Cd. 7717, No. 21. [86] Cd. 7717, No. 30. [87] Cd. 7717, No. 32. [88] Cd. 7717, No. 28. [89] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 9. [90] _Great Britain and the European Crisis_, No. 6. [91] Cd. 7860, page 401. [92] Cd. 7717, No. 41. [93] Cd. 7626, No. 19. [94] Cd. 7717, No. 57. [95] Cd. 7626, No. 20. [96] Cd. 7626, No. 18. [97] Cd. 7717, No. 35. [98] Cd. 7717, No. 83. [99] Cd. 7626, No. 46.