The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
In returning to one of the older cosmologies, the Stoics placed
themselves in opposition to the system of Aristotle as a whole,
although on questions of detail they frequently adopted his
conclusions. The object of Heracleitus, as against the Pythagoreans,
had been to dissolve away every antithesis in a pervading unity
of contradictories; and, as against the Eleatics, to substitute
an eternal series of transformations for the changeless unity of
absolute existence. The Stoics now applied the same method on a scale
proportionate to the subsequent development of thought. Aristotle
had carefully distinguished God from the world, even to the extent
of isolating him from all share in its creation and interest in its
affairs. The Stoics declared that God and the world were one. So far,
it is allowable to call them pantheists. Yet their pantheism was very
different from what we are accustomed to denote by that name; from the
system of Spinoza, for example. Their strong faith in final causes and
in Providence—a faith in which they closely followed Socrates—would
be hardly consistent with anything but the ascription of a distinct
and individual consciousness to the Supreme Being, which is just
what modern pantheists refuse to admit. Their God was sometimes
described as the soul of the world, the fiery element surrounding and
penetrating every other kind of matter. What remained was the body
of God; but it was a body which he had originally created out of his
own substance, and would, in the fulness of time, absorb into that
substance again.[25] Thus they kept the future conflagration foretold
by Heracleitus, but gave it a more religious colouring. The process
of creation was then to begin over again, and all things were to run
the same course as before down to the minutest particulars, human
history repeating itself, and the same persons returning to live the
same lives once more.[26] Such a belief evidently involved the most
rigid fatalism: and here again their doctrine offers a pointed contrast
to that of Aristotle. The Stagirite, differing, as it would seem, in
this respect from all the older physicists, maintained that there was
an element of chance and spontaneity in the sublunary sphere; and
without going very deeply into the mechanism of motives or the theory
of moral responsibility, he had claimed a similar indeterminateness
for the human will. Stoicism would hear of neither; with it, as with
modern science, the chain of causation is unbroken from first to last,
and extends to all phenomena alike. The old theological notion of an
omnipotent divine will, or of a destiny superior even to that will, was
at once confirmed and continued by the new theory of natural law; just
as the predestination of the Reformers reappeared in the metaphysical
rationalism of Spinoza.[27]
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