The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
Plotinus, as we have said, starts with the Aristotelian account of
Matter; but by a process of dialectical manipulation, he gradually
brings it into almost complete agreement with Plato’s conception; thus,
as usual, mediating between and combining the views of his two great
authorities. In the first place, he takes advantage of Aristotle’s
distinction between intelligible and sensible Matter, to strip the
latter of that positive and vital significance with which it had been
clothed in the Peripatetic system. In the world of Ideas, there is an
element common to all specific forms, a fundamental unity in which they
meet and inhere, which may without impropriety be called their Matter.
But this Matter is an eternal and divine substance, inseparably united
with the fixed forms which it supports, and, therefore, something
which, equally with them, receives light and life and thought from
the central source of being. It is otherwise with sensible Matter,
the common substance of the corporeal elements. This is, to use the
energetic expression of our philosopher, a decorated corpse.[481]
It does not remain constantly combined with any form, but is for
ever passing from one to another, without manifesting a particular
preference for any. As such, it is the absolute negation of Form, and
can only be conceived, if at all, by thinking away every sensible
quality. Neither has it any quantity, for quantity means magnitude, and
magnitude implies definite figure. Aristotle opposed to each particular
form a corresponding privation, and placed Matter midway between
them. Plotinus, on the other hand, identifies Matter with the general
privation of all forms. It is at this point that he begins to work his
way back to the Platonic notion of Matter as simple extension. There
must, after all, be something about Matter which enables it to receive
every kind of quality and figure,—it must have some sort of mass or
bulk, not, indeed, in any definite sense, but with an equal capacity
for expansion and for contraction. Now, says Plotinus, the very
indeterminateness of Matter is precisely the capacity for extension in
all directions that we require. ‘Having no principle of stability, but
being borne towards every form, and easily led about in all directions,
it acquires the nature of a mass.’[482]
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