The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy
The Greek Philosophers, Vol. 2 (of 2)
Benn, Alfred William
Philosophy, Ancient
Henceforth, whatever our philosopher says about Matter will apply to
extension and to extension alone. It cannot be apprehended by sight,
nor by hearing, nor by smell, nor by taste, for it is neither colour,
nor sound, nor odour, nor juice. Neither can it be touched, for it is
not a body, but it becomes corporeal on being blended with sensible
qualities. And, in a later essay, he describes it as receiving all
things and letting them depart again without retaining the slightest
trace of their presence.[483] Why then, it may be asked, if Plotinus
meant extension, could he not say so at once, and save us all this
trouble in hunting out his meaning? There were very good reasons why he
should not. In the first place, he wished to express himself, so far as
possible, in Aristotelian phraseology, and this was incompatible with
the reduction of Matter to extension. In the next place, the idea of
an infinite void had been already appropriated by the Epicureans, to
whose system he was bitterly opposed. And, finally, the extension of
ordinary experience had not the absolute generality which was needed
in order to bring Matter into relation with that ultimate abstraction
whence, like everything else, it has now to be derived.
As a result of the preceding analysis, Plotinus at last identifies
Matter with the Infinite—not an infinite something, but the Infinite
pure and simple, apart from any subject of which it can be predicated.
We started with what seemed a broad distinction between intelligible
and sensible Matter. That distinction now disappears in a new and more
comprehensive conception; and, at the same time, Plotinus begins to see
his way towards a restatement of his whole system in clearer terms.
‘The Infinite is generated from the infinity or power or eternity of
the One; not that there is infinity in the One, but that it is created
by the One.’[484] With the first outrush of energy from the primal
fount of things, Matter begins to exist. But no sooner do movement and
difference start into life, than they are restrained and bent back
by the presence of the One; and this reflection of power or being on
itself constitutes the supreme self-consciousness of Nous.[485] Whether
the subsequent creation of Soul involves a fresh production of energy,
or whether a portion of the original stream, which was called into
existence by the One, escapes from the restraining self-consciousness
of Nous and continues its onward flow—this Plotinus does not say. What
he does say is that Soul stands to Nous in the relation of Matter to
Form, and is raised to perfection by gazing back on the Ideas contained
in Nous, just as Nous itself had been perfected by returning to the
One.[486] But while the two higher principles remain stationary,
the Soul, besides giving birth to a fresh stream of energy, turns
towards her own creation and away from the fountain of her life.
And, apparently, it is only by this condescension on her part that
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