When the accounts written by the Divisional and Brigade Staffs are compared with those written by the Commanding Officer and individual officers, there can be no doubt that the information, which trickled back during the day's fighting, was often so incorrect, that it led not only General Capper, but also General Heyworth, to form entirely wrong conclusions as to what was happening in front, and the orders issued were in many instances unintelligible. Communication between the Battalion and the Brigade was maintained by orderlies, and on several occasions when the orderlies were killed the orders never reached the front line, or reached it so long after they had been despatched that the situation in front had completely changed. It hardly seems to have been realised at Divisional Headquarters, how much the artillery bombardments on both sides had obliterated all landmarks. Roads were mentioned of which no trace could be seen, and the four lines of trenches, the old and the new German lines, and the old and the new British lines, no doubt added considerably to the lack of clearness in the orders. The whole position was most complicated, as the Germans had been only partially driven back on the 10th, and consequently their line in places faced in different directions. Though Neuve Chapelle itself was in our hands, the enemy still occupied part of their old line farther north. In order to attack this position, it was necessary to come down the old British trench, and then advance due west for a quarter of a mile, after which the attacking force had to wheel round, and go in a northerly direction. Whether such intricate manoeuvres could ever have been successfully accomplished in the face of machine-gun fire is very doubtful, but there seems to have been no other way of attacking this part of the enemy's line, which jutted out at right angles, and made any advance by the Eighth Division an impossibility. To accomplish its difficult task, the 1st Battalion Grenadiers started with the Gordons on their left. It had hardly reached the road when it came in for a murderous enfilade fire from the German machine-guns on its left front, which very much puzzled the men, who imagined the enemy to be straight in front of them. Two platoons under Lieutenant Ethelston and Second Lieutenant A. Foster had pushed on, and were quite one hundred yards ahead of the rest of the line, but No. 2 Company on the left, being nearest to the German machine-guns, lost very heavily. Lieutenant Lord Brabourne and Second Lieutenant C. F. Burnand were killed, in addition to a large number of N.C.O.'s and men. Soon afterwards Second Lieutenant A. Foster was mortally wounded, being hit in five places.