After some successes on a small scale by the French at St. Pierre Aigle, and by the Americans at Château-Thierry, the Germans launched their third and last offensive on a fifty-mile front in the direction of Rheims, and penetrated the line to a depth of two to three miles. Thirty German divisions took part in this battle, and the fighting was very severe. On July 18 Marshal Foch began his brilliant counter-stroke on a twenty-seven-mile front from Fontenoy to Belleau, and drove the Germans back over the Marne, capturing a large number of prisoners. Although in full retreat, the Germans continued to offer a stubborn resistance, and counter-attacked all along the line. In August Sir Douglas Haig struck with the Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Germans and capturing 22,000 prisoners. Hardly had the enemy recovered from this blow, when the Third Army under Sir Julian Byng advanced on a nine-mile front, and recovered a large portion of the ground that had been lost in the spring. In Italy the Austrians were completely defeated by the Italians, who took a large number of prisoners and guns, and the whole Piave Delta was cleared. These successes were quickly followed up until the Austrians were in full retreat. In Albania the Allied Forces made considerable progress and compelled the Austrians to retire. In Palestine the British positions covering the passages of the Jordan and the north of Jericho were attacked by the Turks. OPERATIONS FROM AUGUST 21 TO 28 _Divisional Account_ [Sidenote: Aug.] After Rawlinson's success on the Somme Byng was ordered to advance, recover the Arras--Albert railway, and generally to hustle the Germans, who were now falling slowly back. This was to be the prelude to the main operation. The attack on August 21 was planned and carried out at exceedingly short notice, and was completely successful. The subsequent daily attacks, executed in pursuance of the policy laid down by higher authority, gave the enemy no rest and no opportunity of organising a new line of resistance, but they rendered the task of coordination with the division on the flanks almost impossible. By the time the position of the advanced troops of the Guards Division at the end of the day's fighting had been ascertained (probably not before 4 A.M.), there was usually only just time to plan and issue orders for the next day's operations. It seldom happened that the situation and intention of the flank divisions could be ascertained before orders were issued, with the result that each division had to work independently. [Sidenote: Aug. 21.]