answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the note of February 27 gave him a right to act, _le cas ÈchÈant_, and that in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated his intention by saying that if England adopted _une politique isolÈe_, he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have understood what this meant--and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I said I did not mean to acquit Palmerston of much negligence and tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously; that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.[5] [Footnote 5: I said that the idea of _intimidating_ France had never entered his head, that he was _un homme de coeur_ himself, and knew that France was too great and too powerful to be intimidated by anyone.] [Sidenote: M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.]