The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and CharacterMcDougall, William
Science
The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology: With Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character
McDougall, William
Ethnopsychology; National characteristics; Social psychology
Psychology was, then, until recent years the science of the abstract
individual mind. Each worker aimed at rendering by the aid of
introspection an analytic description of the stream of his own
consciousness, a consistent classification of the elements or features
that he seemed to discover therein, and some general laws or rules of
the order of succession and conjunction of these features; postulating
in addition some one or more explanatory principles or active agencies
such as ‘the will’ or the desire of pleasure, the aversion from pain, or
‘the association of ideas,’ to enable him to account for the flow of the
distinguishable elements of consciousness. The psychology achieved by
these studies, necessary and valuable as they were, was of little help
to men who were struggling with the concrete problems of human life and
was therefore largely ignored by them. But, as I have pointed out in the
Introduction to my _Social Psychology_, those who approached these
problems were generally stimulated to do so by their interest in
questions of right and wrong, in questions of norms and standards of
conduct, the urgency of which demanded immediate answers for the
practical guidance of human life in all its spheres of activity, for the
shaping of laws, institutions, governments, and associations of every
kind; or, as frequently perhaps, for the justification and defence of
standards of conduct, modes of belief, and forms of institution, which
men had learnt to esteem as supremely good.
Thus the political science of Hobbes was the expression of his attempt
to justify the monarchy established by the Tudors and endangered by the
failings of the Stuart kings; while that of Locke was equally the
outcome of his desire to justify the revolution of 1668. Hobbes felt it
worth while to preface his _magnum opus_ on political philosophy with a
fanciful sketch of human nature and of primitive society; yet, as Mr
Gooch remarks, “neither Hobbes nor his contemporaries knew anything of
the actual life of primitive communities[2].” And it may be added that
they knew as little of the foundations of human nature. Again, the
social doctrines of Rousseau, with all their false psychology, were
formulated in order to stir men to revolt against the conditions of
social life then prevalent in Europe. In a similar way, in the
development of all that body of social doctrine that went under the name
of Utilitarianism and which culminated in the political science and
economy of the Manchester School, every step was prompted by the desire
to find theoretical guidance or justification for rules governing human
activity. And, if we go back to the _Politics_ of Aristotle, we find the
normative or regulative aim still more prominent.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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